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"A cynical, mercenary, demagogic press  
will produce in time a people as base as itself" 
-Joseph Pulitzer, 1904 
 
 
For a significant segment of people, to focus mainly on their own interests, interactions, 
and social pressures means living within horizons that leave politics and state institutions 
in the background. Political life may become salient through elections, contact with the 
government on a special occasion such as jury duty, or by the need for a license to drive, 
build, hunt, buy or sell things, or a “brush” with the law. But in this mode of life, absent any 
large-scale political crisis, political consciousness largely stays in the background of 
consciousness. 
 
John Rawls seems to endorse such a stark division of attention between the private and the 
political. “In a well-governed state,” he wrote, “only a small fraction of persons may devote 
much of their time to politics. There are many other forms of human good”.1   
 
By contrast, Walter Lippmann saw the diversion of attention from politics as an 
unavoidable yet seriously problematic consequence of attempts to govern democratically 
on a large-scale. For Lippmann, exactly the kind of epistemic situation Rawls points to 
would make a mockery of democratic governance. “In the cold light of experience,” he 
wrote in his 1927 book The Phantom Public, “the private citizen knows that his sovereignty 
is a fiction”: 
 
The private citizen today has come to feel rather like a deaf spectator in the back 
row, who ought to keep his mind on the mystery... but who cannot manage to keep 
 
* I first began thinking about the types of norms that might govern salience and attention in 2015 through 
many extensive and illuminating discussions with Sebastian Watzl. My initial writings about this topic in 
(2017) and more recently in “Are there norms of salience?” focused on norms of rationality that apply to 
individual minds. Sebastian and I discussed for years whether there might be some sort of rational pressure 
on individuals to pay more attention to what’s more important, but we struggled to pinpoint the kind of 
importance at issue. The microstructure of the world is important, and so are fire departments; but there 
seems to be no general rational pressures to pay attention fire departments, and the sense in which everyone 
faces a rational pressure to study the periodic table and other wonders of the world remained elusive to me. 
Since the examples that struck me as illustrating the general idea that what’s important should be attended 
had always involved journalism, I came to suspect that journalism itself might best illuminate importance 
norms of salience. At that point the target of my thinking shifted from norms of rationality to norms that 
constrain us by virtue of the type of political community some of us live in, which I call an aspirational 
democracy. For help in thinking through this idea I’m indebted to Justin Pottle, Emma Ebowe, Denish Jaswal, 
and most of all to Danielle Allen and the attendees of her Fall 2020 seminar. 
1 Rawls, Political Liberalism, section 36. 
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awake. He knows he is somehow affected by what’s going on. Rules and regulations 
continually, taxes annually, and wars occasionally remind him that he is being swept 
along by great drifts of circumstance.  
Yet these public affairs are in no convincing way his affairs. They are for the 
most part invisible. They are managed, if they are managed a tall, at distant centers, 
from behind the scenes, by unnamed powers. As a private person he does not know 
what is going on, or who is doing it, or where he is being carried.... He lives in a 
world which he cannot see, does not understand, and is unable to direct... 
Contemplating...his actual accomplishments in public affairs, [he can] 
contrast...the influence he exerts, with the influence he is supposed according to 
democratic theory to exert.” (p.3) 
 
Where Rawls seems to suggest that directing attention to public affairs is optional in a 
nearly-just democracy, Lippmann suggests that everyone’s doing so is all but impossible - 
to the detriment of democratic aspirations. 
 
 The informational disconnect that Lippmann highlights can be bridged only by 
means of mass communication. Modern democracy, on this view, needs mass 
communication.2 But what kind does it need? 
 
 Lippmann thought it needed newspapers overseen by an editor who would select 
and oversee news stories shaped by the goal of finding out hidden truths about complex 
things that matter to the public. Journalists would need to draw on another institution at 
the interface between journalism and government: “political observatories,” designed to 
pre-digest the technical expertise that the politicians draw on, and to make the 
complexities of governing legible to non-experts. Political observatories would enable 
journalists to convey complex issues of everyday governance to the public, and would give 
them information they’d need to hold both governmental officers and corporations 
accountable to the public.  
 
 The deaf spectator is politically bewildered, Lippmann thought, because “no 
newspaper reports his environment so that he can grasp it” (p.4). By publicly presenting 
simplified technical information, journalists could begin to rectify this situation. And by 
using information about the processes of governance to hold officials accountable to the 
people, journalists could bridge the epistemic gap between government and the public. In 
this picture, professional journalists become second-hand experts whose role is to un-
bewilder an otherwise clueless population. They address the public from the distance of an 
informed commentator – as Lippmann was himself. 
 
 Though Lippmann's paradigm of a "deaf spectator" is someone who is only 
"occasionally reminded" by war or taxes that the political order impacts everyday life, the 
need for journalism he identified applies equally to people with ongoing awareness of this 
basic fact.  In a crisis such a ground war, a hurricane, or a pandemic, the fact that everyday 
 
2 By "modern democracy" I mean representative democracies at a large enough scale that each member of the 
polity is personally acquainted with only a small fraction of everyone else in it.   
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life can be made steady or unsteady by political order or disorder is glaringly plain. And 
absent crises like these, there are at least two sets of people for whom the impact of 
political institutions regularly occupies the foreground of consciousness: political elites, 
who job relates them directly to the government, and incarcerated persons or others living 
under frequent or even constant surveillance by the state.  Whether the precarities 
involved in large-scale social coordination are hidden or evident, the need for journalism 
remains.   
 
 Professional print journalism as it emerged in the 1920’s in the US was shaped by 
Lippmann’s vision of mass communication.3 It institutionalized a salience principle of 
importance: make salient information that is important for the public to know about. In this 
principle, which I'll call the importance principle for short, "newsworthiness" is a 
normative notion, tied to whatever is actually important for the public to know about. I'll 
use "newsworthiness" in this normative sense. A different notion would define 
newsworthy content as whatever content will in fact attract attention if reported in a news 
outlet, whether it is important to know about or not. In a digital context, the newsworthy in 
this other sense would align with being 'shareworthy'.  But is use is not the one at work 
here. 
 
 What would the news be like, if it lived up to the importance principle? In the ideal 
defined by the principle, the news would be full of things worth paying attention to, and it 
wouldn’t be the case that most newsworthy things are left out of the news.  
 
This paper is about a problem that arises from this ideal. I call it the problem of 
democratic attention. The problem is that some roles for journalism in democracy depend 
on readers actually taking in the information that would be made salient by journalism, 
when  journalism fulfills the importance principle. But for much important information, 
many readers have no antecedent interest in it, feel no prior motivation to learn it, and face 
substantial obstacles to paying attention to information even when it is widely available, 
and even when it would yield knowledge that would be useful to have. The problematic 
upshot is that democracy imposes an attentional demand that can't easily be met.  
 
 Democracy in many of its guises has frequently held to be too demanding. Does 
representative democracy rely on a population with stable, well-formed opinions about 
public policy, who are disposed to select representatives ready to respect their 
preferences? Achen and Bartels (2016) argue that people simply don't have such stable 
preferences, so any democratic scheme on which they guide voters in selecting 
representatives demands more of voters than they can give. Does democracy's ideal of 
political equality rely on sidelining powerful group affinities, even when doing so would 
yield political losses? Delany (1852) had his doubts that white supremacy in America 
would ever allow democracy there to flourish - doubts felt forcefully by some theorists 
 
3 On the emergence of professional journalism and its contrast with the “partisan” press that preceded it in 
the nineteenth century US, see Schudson (1978) and (2020). 
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today.4 Would true self-governance require citizens to deliberate and discuss political 
matters with one another? Mansbridge (1980) argues that in practice, deliberation 
historically ended up distinctly undemocratic, leading to domination by better-educated 
citizens - a generalization echoed by Mutz (2006). 
 
These criticisms point to ways in which representative, deliberative, and liberal 
democracy seem to ask a lot of our abilities to detach from group allegiance, or deliberate, 
or form policy preferences. By contrast, the problem of democratic attention concerns our 
capacity to take in the information on the basis of which we would do any of those things. 
The challenge finds obstacles to forming even our most basic understandings of public 
political life - a precondition for our forming opinions, preferences, or allegiances regarding 
our political arrangements. 
 
The problem of democratic attention arises in part from the importance principle. 
I'll argue that a different, more specific salience principle can help address it: the public-as-
protagonist principle. 
 
In Part I of this paper I develop the challenge of democratic attention. Since there is 
little point in addressing a merely apparent problem, it is worth considering the point of 
view from which the purported problem isn't really a problem, either because the roles for 
journalism in democracy do not after all exert normative pressure on attention, or because 
respecting the importance principle is enough to ensure that the public pays attention to 
the degree it has to. Against these perspectives, I argue that the problem is indeed a 
challenge for journalism in aspirational democracies.5  
 
In Part II I develop the public-as-protagonist principle. I'm presuming without 
argument that it would be a good thing for democracy - and a good thing, period - if news 
was selected and framed by this principle, and if readers saw themselves and all their 
fellow denizens of the polity in the ways the principle invites them to: as political 
protagonists with a stake and a say in the political future. On this assumption, the principle 
is worth developing, regardless of whether it helps solve the problem of democratic 
attention. But I'll argue that there are reasons to think it would help. 
 
4 Hooker (2017). And in considering "the security [white Americans'] identity provide[s]", Melvin asks 
pointedly: "who among us would readily give up such security, even for the noble values of equality, freedom, 
and justice?...[W]e must grapple with...the possibility that white supremacy generates far too many 
psychological, libidinal, cultural, political and economic goods to be sufficiently destabilized or decentered." 
(p. 181). 
5 What is an aspirational democracy? I mean a society with democratic political institutions, such as regularly 
holding free and fair elections to determine political succession, with a history full of actors claiming to aspire 
to democratic political culture that will fulfill the promise of those institutions. Long-standing debates in US 
history concern which political actors, among those who expressed such aspirations, were genuinely 
committed to them, and which have used aspirational language as a guise. A parallel question arises about the 
functions of purportedly democratic institutions. As many writers have shown, aspirational democracies in 
this sense are compatible with political cultures that are deeply anti-democratic in many respects (a point 
developed recently using examples from many parts of the world by Keane 2020, Ben-Ghiat 2020). For the 
democratic roles of journalism to get their purchase, however, the cultural entrenchment of claims to 
democratic aspiration is enough.  
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Part 1.  The problem of democratic attention 
 
 I'll explicate the problem of democratic attention for the specific case of the United 
States, where most of my examples will be drawn from. But the problem is general. It could 
face any aspirational democracy that contains journalism in the professionalized form born 
in the 1920's United States. It arises from the combination of three points: 
  
(1) Professional journalism is governed by an importance principle of salience.  
 
(2) Some roles for journalism in democracy depend on readers actually taking  in 
 information that would be made salient by journalism, if journalism fulfilled the 
 importance principle.  
 
(3) For much important information, many readers have no antecedent interest in it, 
 and feel no prior motivation for taking it in.  
 
I'll argue that taken together, these points create a problem: large swaths of any public are 
liable to lack a disposition to pay attention to important information made salient by 
journalism, even though they face pressure to do just that by virtue of living in an 
aspirational democracy.  
 
To feel the force of problem, and to recognize potential solutions to it, its central 
notions need to be unpacked. Regarding point (1): what exactly is the importance principle 
and how does it regulate the news? Regarding point (2): what are journalism's roles in 
democracy, and what kinds of demands do they place on the public's attention? Regarding 
point (3): what principles of salience in news journalism facilitate or anti-facilitate 
democratic forms of political engagement?  
 
1.1 Journalism and the importance principle  
 Salience and attention are closely related. To make something salient is to put it 
forward as both demanding attention and deserving it. On the receiving end, when 
something becomes salient to us we experience it as demanding our attention. Whether we 
experience it as also deserving attention is a further question.6  The more salient something 
is to someone, the more easily available to them it is, so that they can react to it.  
 
 When a newspaper publishes a story or an image, it presents that content as 
something that calls for attention, and makes it available to be noticed. A news story is 
more easily available, and therefore more salient, if it is on the front page of a print or 
 
6 In Siegel (2014) I discuss nuances surrounding the phenomenology of salience, including the possibility of 
experiencing something as demanding attention without experiencing it as deserving attention. For more on 
the phenomenology of salience see Munton (forthcoming), Watzl (2019) and Watzl (this volume), and for 
comprehensive discussion of the differences between salience in linguistic contexts (where salience of 
linguistic content can explain framing effects) and contexts of cognition, see Whiteley (2019). 
 6 
digital newspaper, than if it is several clicks or pages away. In a digital context, a story is 
more salient, the more places a link to the story appears. 
 
 Salience is distinct from actual uptake. In principle, a news story can be salient 
without anyone actually noticing it, let alone reading it, understanding it, remembering it, 
reacting to it, drawing any conclusions from it, or otherwise integrating it with anything 
else they know, suspect, want, feel, or believe.  
 
 Some stimuli capture attention as soon as they become salient. Think of bright 
flashes or honking horns. News stories are not quite in this category. No matter how salient 
they are, their salience is not a guarantee of their uptake.  
 
  A principle of salience for a type of communication system is a guide to what should 
be made salient and what should not be. In the context of professional news journalism, the 
principle of salience is the importance principle. The importance principle says to make 
salient the things that are important for the public to know about. 
 
 The formal aspect of this principle applies to journalism in any type of regime, 
whether it is democratic or not. The formal aspect is distinct from procedural and 
substantive aspects, which can reflect political values. 
 
 The formal aspect of the importance principle is that merely by including a story, 
image, or information under the guise of "news" in a newspaper, its content is presented as 
important for readers to pay attention to. The formal aspect is evident in a structure of 
presenting information that makes it more prominent than others. Print media reserves a 
“front page” for the stories presented as most important.  Digital media preserves a 
structure that uses degrees of prominence to mark degrees of importance.  A digital version 
of a newspaper treats the first things you see as more important than stories found several 
clicks away within the newspaper’s interface.7 
 
 In its formal aspect, the importance principle applies to journalism in any type of 
regime. Consider the role of mass communication in the type of autocracy led by a 
strongman, as described by Ruth Ben-Ghiat: 
 
“the strongman has turned politics into an aesthetic experience, with him as the 
star. The communication codes and celebrity cultures of film, television, and now 
digital storytelling shape the leader’s self-presentation and the images he releases of 
both followers and enemies.”8  
 
 
7 Using spatial structure to mark importance was an innovation of professionalizing journalism. During the 
nineteenth century, in newspapers in the US and Europe, the contents of newspapers were a miscellany of 
poems, fiction, verbatim reports, and often the order in which things appeared reflected  the order in which 
these items arrived at the news office. Schudson (1978) and (2020). 
8 Ben-Ghiat 2020, p. 93. 
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Such leaders aim to develop a cult of personality in which they remain the central 
spectacular protagonist. Often they are demagogues who purport to have a special direct 
relationship to “the people” in the polity that they aim to govern. A newspaper, news reel, 
radio or television program that facilitates these narratives fulfill the formal aspects of the 
importance principle, by circulating stories that satisfy the leader's modes of self-
presentation, while presenting them under the guise of information that is important for 
the public to understand.  
 
 In its formal aspect, the importance principle is compatible with the types of mass 
communication made for pointedly anti-democratic politics. A demagogic strongman 
refuses to treat "the people" as an abstraction that can only be evoked indirectly by the 
principles of government that should unite it, and instead tries to present the public as a 
palpable crowd that he addresses directly in rallies, where he brings the narratives 
conveyed by newsreels, radio addresses, or twitter feeds to life. Mass rallies build a direct 
emotional connection between the strongman and follower, giving the impression that the 
public can be seen and felt. In the live crowd bewitched and unified by the strongman's 
speeches, the public becomes whole. This kind of public is not represented by the leader, 
but partly constituted by him.9 
 
 These observations bring out an unstated assumption in Lippmann's construal of 
the need for journalism, an assumption that Dewey made explicit: the public is nebulous 
and cannot be perceived or grasped directly.10  It takes act of imagination for the public to 
figure in its members' minds. As Danielle Allen puts it: 
 
 "Democracy's basic term is neither 'liberty' nor 'equality', but 'the people.' But 
 where and what is this thing, the people?...How can one even hold an idea of this 
 strange body in one's head? Only with figures, metaphors, and other imaginative 
 forms."11 
 
The elusiveness of the public presents a challenge: what features of society will enable 
people to grasp the polity to which they belong? 
 
 In the character of mass communication, we find completely opposite answers to 
this question. The mass rallies essential to fascist demagoguery purport to make the public 
concrete, by generating enormous crowds that give the impression of being so massive as 
to include nearly everyone who matters in the region. The leader tries to stoke their 
feelings of righteousness, using chants and jeers against political enemies construed as 
illegitimate and deserving of violence. As the epigraph from Pulitzer suggests, 
 
9 "We won the election," said Trump after he lost the election. "It was stolen from us". (Egan 2021). Winners 
and losers of elections are candidates. But in narratives shaped by this grammar, there is no public 
protagonist distinct from the leader.  
10 Dewey (1927) characterized the nebulous nature of the public when he wrote “If a public exists , 
it is surely as uncertain about its own whereabouts as philosophers since Hume have been about 
the residence and make-up of the self" (p. 150). 
11 Allen (2004), p. 69. 
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professionalized journalism can echo this way of imagining the public. But when it does, it 
plays second fiddle to the direct channels of communication that strongman leaders 
depend upon to cultivate their idea of a public made whole by the leader. 
 
 The democratic potential of professionalized journalism derives from its capacity to 
portray a pluralistic public, and for its reports to involve protagonists other than and even 
opposed to a strongman.  That is why fascist politics is hostile to journalism. Its democratic 
potential comes from further constraints on the importance principle, which can be found 
in the structures and genres of professional journalism. In “Liberty and the News”, Walter 
Lippmann writes: 
 
“[t]he newspaper is in all literalness the bible of democracy, the book out of which a 
people determines its conduct...Now the power to determine each day what shall 
seem important and what shall be neglected is a power unlike any that has been 
exercised since the Pope lost hold on the secular mind.” 
 
Here, Lippmann makes explicit that newspapers select things that should be treated as 
important for democracy.  His guiding idea of democracy is that “a people determines its 
conduct." What kinds of things are important, given this construal of democracy?  
 
 As Lippmann recognized, in the American context, the guiding democratic idea that 
“a people determines its conduct" involves a delicate balance between popular preference, 
constitutional constraints, and expertise. People who lack expertise of various kinds would 
have little idea which cooperative schemes would be best; but leaving all terms of 
coordination up experts would remove any pretense to political equality or accountability.  
In Lippmann's vision, journalism can help to strike this balance, by building channels of 
communication between experts and everyone else, and by making public the stakes and 
challenges of social coordination. That makes journalists a locus of mediation between 
overlapping publics, figures of political establishments, and experts - the very forces whose 
balance determines the extent of liberal democracy.  
 
 Lippmann took for granted a political structure in which leaders were 
representatives of the people, and therefore accountable to them. The roles for journalism 
he outlined stem from this assumption. 
 
 How is journalism supposed to contribute to the correct balance? For a start, the 
organizational structure of newspapers traditionally divided the “news side” from the 
“business side” (sometimes denoted using exalted terminology of "Church and State", 
where the business side is the Church). Institutionally, the news and business sides 
traditionally had separate modes of management, different offices, and different staff.12 For 
 
12 A separate topic, sidelined here, is the ways the economics of news helps construct a public (see Strömberg 
(2002)). Ads that reach more people are more effective and therefore more lucrative for newspapers, a fact 
that may pressure the news to become 'bland' and avoid 'extremes'. An older example: National Organization 
for Women began with a protest against the New York Times' sex-segregated ads, in which the same job was 
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the many decades in which print newspapers were lucrative, newspapers would not 
typically be financially threatened by running stories critical of their advertisers, and they 
did. A famous case from 1950 illustrates this: the Wall Street Journal published an article 
that offended General Motors, who then pulled their ads from the paper. The paper was 
unapologetic, and said ultimately no one would read the newspaper if they thought its 
content was controlled by their advertisers.13  
 
 This institutional division is a procedural aspect of the importance principle. It is a 
negative constraint: don't let the news be unduly influenced by advertisers. But beyond the 
negative constraint, what substantive constraints are there on the importance principle? 
 The major substantive constraint is in professional journalism's brief to "follow the 
story", and the skills needed to carry it out. A "story" is something that has be followed - 
not invented by a strongman or demagogue.  A story is built of facts - not of lies that suit the 
teller or promote a campaign of persuasion. Given this conception of a story woven from 
facts, it follows the skills journalists need are literary and epistemic. The literary skill is 
knowing how to tell a story, and the epistemic skill is knowing how to verify reliable 
sources, how to establish which things are true.  Taken together, these skills amount to an 
ability to inquire. To follow a story, one needs to know which questions to ask, and how to 
determine which answers to them are correct. Once again, we can see why journalism 
construed in this way falls out of favor with modes of government that shun transparency 
and have no structure of accountability, and why conversely it is essential for democratic 
modes of government oriented around accountability.  
 Other substantive constraints are evident in the main genres of news journalism. 
There is accountability or watchdog journalism, and reporting on the workings of 
government or political campaigns. There are portraits of a neighborhood or a 
subpopulation; reporting focused on problems that arise from sharing public space, or 
disputes about which things are public goods, or public health concerns; and investigations 
of possible crimes,14 especially ‘white-collar’ ones occurring within powerful institutions.15 
The prevalence of these genres of reporting in American journalism shows that the 
substantive constraints in the importance principle have been clearly operative, and that 
they are designed for a multitude of publics and plurality of points of view. 
 
advertised for men and women in different places so that different wages could be listed - also lucrative for 
the newspapers (Rosen 2000).  
13 Abramson (2019) paints a vivid picture of the pressures on this traditional division in the digital 
age, making evident the weight of the tradition. The GM example is on p. 70. 
14 In a paper keyed to American democracy and aptly titled "Six or seven things news does for democracy", 
Schudson (2008) gives a related list: (i) inform about doings of powerful leaders; (ii) investigate doings of 
elected officials;  (iii) simplify complex information about government; (iv) portray the many modes life in a 
polity in a way that casts them with a pall of acceptability; (v) provide a public forum, e.g. via letters to the 
editor and op-eds; (vi) mobilize and advocate; (vii) report on the workings and findings of accountability 
mechanisms internal to the executive branch, or their dissolution, including (in the U.S.) the offices 
overseeing Freedom of Information Act requests, the General Accounting office, Federal Election Commission, 
and the Department of Justice.   
15 This last example includes government accountability but is not limited to it. A contemporary example is 
Miami Herald reporter Julie K. Brown’s reporting on the Jeffrey Epstein’s large-scale sex trafficking operation, 
which was used by the prosecution (a point made by Sullivan in her (2020).  
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 Substantive constraints on the importance principle are also evident in public 
criticisms of journalism charged with failing to make salient important events, facts, or 
inquiries.  Consider a recent six-part retrospective series by the Kansas City Star re-
examining how it has covered issues affecting Black Kansas Citians for the past 140 years.16 
One of its starkest self-criticisms concerns reports about the newspaper's neglect to 
investigate the underlying reason that a local school district made dozens of boundary 
changes during a two-year period, some of which were only a single block. These reports 
could not be faulted for inaccuracy or lack of verification, but are now criticized for what 
they failed to make salient: that it was an attempt to bypass desegregation laws. Mará Rose 
Williams, the reporter who instigated the retrospective review, voices the criticism like 
this:  
  
 "We may have written about a boundary change as it occurred at a school board 
 meeting. But what we didn't do was make the connection as to why they were 
 making these boundary changes. We didn't dig in deep enough to make the 
 connection that it was to keep the schools segregated, to keep White children in one 
 part of town and Black children in another part of town, which was also a violation 
 of federal law at the time."17 
This example illustrates that sometimes for journalists to make important information 
salient to the public, questions that open important lines of inquiry must first be salient to 
the journalists.   
 The same retrospective review notes other examples of omissions that failed to 
report on things that were important for the public to know about. In his introduction to its 
six-art series, editor Mark Fannin describes how the newspaper covered the devastating 
1977 flood by reporting on property damage of J.C. Nichols, a wealthy white developer. 
Fannin writes: 
 "The Star [and its then-sister paper, the Times] quickly dubbed it “The Plaza Flood.” 
 That set the stage for the papers...to focus mainly on property damage at the 
 Country Club Plaza, not so much the 25 people who died, including eight Black 
 residents."18 
He adds: "White businessman J.C. Nichols got plenty of ink. His advertisements promoting 
segregated communities ran prominently in The Star and Times. Nichols, who developed 
the Country Club Plaza, was a protege of The Star’s founder, William Rockhill Nelson, who 
enthusiastically supported his effort." Fannin is suggesting here that the newspaper failed 
to respect the importance principle twice over. Procedurally, it failed to insulate judgments 
of newsworthiness from business interests; and substantively, it neglected to include 
stories it should have reported. 
 
16 Fannin (2020). 
17 NPR interview with Mará Rose Williams and Mark Fannin about Kansas City Star, December 20, 2020. See 
also Williams (2020b)  
18 Fannin (2020). 
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 Another type of criticism based on the importance principle focuses on the inclusion 
of facts and pursuit of inquiries that should not have been made salient, but were.  
 For example, during the U.S. Presidential campaign in 1992, the talk show host Phil 
Donahue focused his interview with Bill Clinton on his marijuana use, and the recent 
revelations by Gennifer Flowers to a tabloid that of an extra-marital affair lasting many 
years. The focus on those “personal” things was roundly criticized, even by some of 
Clinton's opponents, for being the wrong kind of thing for the press to focus on during a 
presidential campaign.19 Where was the discussion of his platform and principles and 
policies? How would the focus on “character” help people understand how this candidate 
would connect politics to government, if he were elected? The Phil Donahue type of 
questioning added to US political journalism’s poor reputation at that time. People thought 
news coverage wasn’t focused on the right things.  
 For the importance principle to operate in a culture of journalism, there need not be  
consensus on what is important to include or exclude, even in retrospect. Consider the e-
mails hacked by Russian intelligence operatives in the summer of 2016.20 Once the emails 
were released, the press coverage focused intensely on the content of the emails – not on 
the fact that Russia, a rival power, had infiltrated one of the two main political parties of the 
US. By focusing on the contents of the emails treated those contents as information that 
was important for the public to know, instead of focusing the story on the electoral 
interference itself. 
 
 When media commentators debated whether the contents of the emails should have 
been revealed, the debate illustrated that the importance principle operates in the culture 
of news production.  Both sides assumed the importance principle. They disagreed about 
which information was important to reveal.21  
 
19 Reprinted in Kurz 1992, cited by Rosen 1992, who discusses these criticisms. At the time, 
Clinton’s liaison with Flowers was viewed simply as part of his personal life, and not as potential 
locus of sexual domination. A quarter-century later, in 2018, Gennifer Flowers told Fox News host 
Laura Ingraham that although she didn’t see it that way at the time, the liaison began as what she 
would now consider sexual harassment (Mikelionis 2018). Had the issue been framed that way in 
1992, it might not any longer have seemed merely to be sensational facts about Bill Clinton’s 
personal life. It might have been considered a political matter: does this person understand sexual 
forms of domination and will he oppose them? 
 
20 Shortly after the release of the Access Hollywood tape in which the Republican presidential 
candidate boasted of sexual assault, and just before the Democratic National Convention in July 
which would kick off Hilary Clinton’s presidential campaign, Russian intelligence operatives 
released to Wikipedia a trove of emails that had been sent to Democratic Party Chair John Podesta. 
The emails had been hacked by Russia’s Internet Research Agency, one branch of the successor to 
the Soviet-era KGB. They detailed the inner workings of the Clinton campaign. 
21 In the specific case, some people took the contents of the emails to be important to publish 
because they provide a window in the workings of a party that had long seemed impenetrable and 
insidery, while others argued that a political party has a right to decide how to present itself at its 
convention (Shimer 2020, Snyder 2018, p. 234). The latter position sees the invasion of the DNC 
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1.2 Journalism’s roles in democracy and their demands on public attention 
    
The importance principle is the first ingredient in the puzzle of democratic 
attention. The second ingredient is a set of demands on public attention.  
 
News stories are addressed to any readers of the newspaper. We could say that they 
address the superset of politizens: denizens of a polity, of any size ("politizens" - a 
contraction of "denizens of a polity").22 Some news stories will be important for all 
politizens, other stories will be most important to some and less important to others. But 
for any story, there is a public it most closely concerns. 
 
Phenomenologically, like anything salient, a story, image, or headline in a 
newspaper is presented as something that deserves attention of readers - whether it really 
does deserve such attention, or not. When content that does not deserve attention are 
presented as if they do, we could say its demand is a sham. It exerts no genuine normative 
pressure on readers to pay them any attention. 
 
When news stories fulfill the importance principle, by contrast, we can ask: what 
kind of attention do they demand, and of whom? 
 
One extreme response rejects the presumption that news stories demand anything 
at all of readers. It is enough simply for news to be salient, and that happens as soon as it is 
published. Availability is enough. On this view, the role of a newspaper in a democracy is 
analogous to a public records office, and that role is complete once information is available, 
regardless of whether anyone actually reads it. 
 
This extreme response is at odds with the central roles for journalism in democracy 
envisaged by Lippmann. If one of journalism's roles is to provide simplified technical 
information such as explaining the basic points of a health care or police reform bill, or the 
reasons for a new traffic safety measure, or how to prevent or stem the tide of a pandemic, 
this role will be incomplete if hardly anyone actually learns about these things.  If such 
information was presented in the news but got no uptake from the public, the public could 
easily remain just as bewildered as they would be without the information.  
 
 A different role, associated more with John Dewey than with Lippmann, is to make a 
public aware of problems that affect a range of different stakeholders, and in doing so, 
 
emails as comparable to an invasion of personal privacy by a voyeur who invades a family’s privacy, 
planting a camera in their bathroom and bedroom, spying on people in their private moments. It 
would be grotesque if the press reported on what the camera saw, as part of the report of the crime. 
If anything is a matter of public concern it is the fact that privacy was invaded.     
 On the ethics of reporting on information obtained unethically, see Shafer 2017, Sullivan 2019.  
22 This handy term avoids the overly specific implications of "citizens", and allows us to describe 
polities at any scale - school, company, neighborhood, city, country, international organization, etc.  
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make visible which stakeholders are connected to one another by those problems.23  For 
journalism to help politizens become aware of the different stakeholders who are 
connected by a problem, there is no way for it to play this epistemic role without actual 
uptake. This point holds at large scales and small: in a company, a school community, a 
group of people who want or need to use the same space in multiple and potentially 
conflicting ways, a city, a country, and so on. 
 
What about accountability or watchdog journalism? Does it demand any actual 
uptake? And if it does, from whom?  
 
In discussing journalism's watchdog role, Michael Schudson suggests that only an 
"inner circle" of citizens have to pay attention to accountability reporting: 
 
"Journalism performs its institutional role as a watchdog even if nobody in the 
 provinces is following the news. All that matters is that people in government 
 believe that some people somewhere are following the news. All that is necessary to 
 inspire this belief is that an inner circle of attentive citizens is watchful. This is 
 sufficient to produce in the leaders a fear of public embarrassment or public 
 discrediting, public controversy, legal prosecution, or fear of losing an election."24 
 
If Schudson is correct, the problem of democratic attention might seem to dissolve for the 
crucial case of accountability journalism. On this picture, watchdog journalism's demands 
on attention are both mild and easy to meet, because the demand on attention affects only 
those people who are disposed to pay attention anyway. For journalism to play a watchdog 
role, it is enough for the news in this category to be known by the "inner circle" that 
matters for politics. Their attention is enough to effectively monitor the workings of 
powerful leaders. 
 
Is this picture correct? 
 
Let's distinguish reports on actual cases of grift and corruption from the regular presence 
of journalists at meetings of school boards or city councils.  The mere presence of 
journalists at government meetings lowers the cost of local governance, and helps prevent 
corruption.25 It plays its preventive role in part by affording the possibility of publicizing 
corruption, were it to occur. This role is also played by reporting on ho-hum proceedings. 
Public records of such meeting proceedings are important for record-keeping, but few 
people read them, and arguably the reports don't even exert pressure on anyone to read 
them. Does this kind of reporting then undermine the idea that fulfilling the importance 
principle generates demands on the reading public's attention? 
 
 
23  Dewey (1927). An example of reporting that does this is Nanos and Leung (2020). 
24 Schudson (2008), p. 14. 
25 On lowering costs, see Gao et al 2018. For evidence of links between local accountability 
journalism, civic engagement, and corruption, see Sullivan 2020 and (for a discussion focused on 
Missouri) Kendzior 2020. 
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No, because reports of uneventful meetings, or reports made for record-keeping, often do 
not fulfill the importance principle. It is not important for the public to know that nothing  
untoward happened in the day to day business of governing. If this reassuring fact is 
proven by publishing a story that notes the ho-hum proceedings, and such a story counts as 
part of watchdog journalism, then we should conclude that the importance principle is not 
the only principle of salience. This fact does not undermine the problem of democratic 
attention, because the problem arises only if much of the public is not disposed to pay 
attention to news that does fulfill the importance principle.    
 
Is Schudson's picture correct for reporting on actual corruption? Schudson 
mentions people "in the provinces." Let's assume they are voters to whom the leaders are 
officially accountable. If the leaders could be confident that these voters would not learn 
about their grift or other forms of corruption, why should they fear public embarrassment? 
Schudson's picture assumes if the voters outside the inner circle have any political role at 
all, their role is fully determined by the power of the inner circle to discredit a corrupt 
leader in the eyes of those voters, without the voters ever hearing about the corruption. 
And this pushes the question back one step: if voters "in the provinces" are not paying 
attention to the leader, they are presumably also not paying attention to the watchful inner 
circle, which makes it hard to see how the inner circle could influence them. 
 
The watchdog role in making offenses costly to powerful leaders requires that the 
leaders' fear of public embarrassment is reasonable. They lose any reason to fear 
embarrassment, if they can be confident that the population at large won't care about the 
offense, either because they don't know about it, or because they but don't know its 
significance.26 So the watchdog role seems to require actual uptake. When Mark Meadows 
was Trump's chief of staff, he defended the repeated violations of the Hatch Act by high-
ranking members of the Trump administration by asserting "No one outside the Beltway 
cares" about such offenses.27  As Meadows and the administration he worked for knew, 
convincing the public not to believe, listen, or care about violations of the Hatch Act is a 
good way to make such violations seem like no big deal. 
 
1.3 Can the public meet journalism's demands? 
 So far, I've highlighted several roles for journalism in democracy: monitoring 
powerful leaders, closing informational gaps, and making different segments of 
 
26 A related problem is that powerful leaders are not embarrassed at all by corruption, even if 
people all over do know about it, because they are confident that they will not face consequences 
for illegal actions (see Burgis (2020), Kleptopia, Keane (2020), The New Despotism. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press). On the role of journalism in monitoring such anti-democratic divisions, 
Schudson's seventh role for news in his (2008) is relevant: reporting on the internal systems of 
accountability in government, or on the need for such systems if they have been dismantled. When 
framed by the public-as-protagonist principle, such reporting would highlight the consequences for 
the public of losing such institutions and making vivid for readers what it could be like if such 
institutions were in place. 
27 Choi (2020) 
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overlapping publics visible to one another. For news stories to play these roles, I've argued, 
they require actual uptake on a wide scale.   
  
If some of the things that are important to know about lie entirely outside our 
concerns, then it's an open question what, if anything, might motivate us to actually pay 
attention to them. And here there are at least two major obstacles to mobilizing attention. 
 
The first obstacle is the mere cognitive load that meeting every demand on attention 
that important news would impose. Here, important news is on par with much else that's 
worthwhile to know about. It would be worthwhile for me to know more about the many 
amazing regularities captured by the periodic table of elements. The same is true for 
countless histories, problems, stories, poems, and facts that live between the covers of the 
books, journals, and archives in libraries all over the world. I am unlikely to pay any 
attention to most of it, given how much of it there is. The library is full of good books, and 
the sad fact is that none of us will ever read them all.   
 
Cognitive load would be far less significant an obstacle to taking in important news 
if we found the news to be readily engaging. This observation brings us to the second and 
perhaps even bigger obstacle to journalism's demands on attention. Stories about things 
that are important to know about may lack the features that tend to engage attention 
readily. Important news is often not sensational. It only sometimes provokes fear, 
indignation, offense, humor or joy – all things that prompt “viral” circulation in modes of 
mass communication that are governed by different salience principles from the one 
governing professional journalism. Social media platforms highlight content that tracks the 
time spent with a browser occupied by a website.  There is no editor deciding what is 
important to make public, no entrenched culture of an institution meant to serve an 
essential role in democracy, and no libel laws criminalizing the publication of harmfully 
false information.28  
 
 Few people have to be urged to check their social media accounts. Instead we are 
sometimes admonished (and sometimes admonish ourselves) not to spend so much time 
on those platforms.29 Virality is a measure of one kind of engagement, but the markers of 
virality are not co-extensive with information that is important for the public to know 
about.30 Journalism’s importance principle and social media platforms’ engagement 
principle each select different content to bring to salience.  
 
28 On this last issue, see D. Citron and M. Franks (2020) “The internet as a speech machine and other 
myths confounding section 230 speech reform.” Boston University Law School, Public Law and 
Legal Theory paper 20-8. 
29 J. Lanier (2018); Center for Humane Technology (https://www.humanetech.com/) 
30 That virality will not track importance is evident from the factors that prompt virality. These 
factors include formats of lists ("10 tactics to help you find a husband", "29 things I learned from 
spending two days with Rick Santorum") and quizzes ("which Muppet/Billionaire Tycoon/etc are 
you?"), and short-lasting, low-impact modes of affect: images or stories that 'restore faith in 
humanity', nostalgia, the short arousals expressed by LOL, cute, Fail, WTF. Content markers of 
virality include celebrities, animals, and food. These examples come from Abramson's excellent 
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So there appears to be a mismatch. Professional journalism purports to generate 
importance norms of attention, while social media does not; but attention gravitates much 
more readily to social media platforms governed by principles of engagement than it does 
to news outlets governed by importance principle – even when conformity with the 
importance principle is far from perfect. The mismatch suggests an uphill battle when it 
comes to drawing wide attention to things that are important for the public to understand. 
 
 
2. Is the problem merely apparent? 
  
A skeptic might propose that the problem is merely apparent, because it is actually 
an artifact of the failure of news media to live up to its own importance principle. On this 
view, the only problem in the vicinity is that too often, the importance principle isn’t 
actually fulfilled. Even though new outlets present their content under that mode of 
presentation of importance, the things they deem newsworthy are frequently not actually 
important for the public to understand, and that is why people devote less attention to 
them. Truly important information is also always engaging, on this view, and that is why 
there is no real problem of democratic attention. The appearance of such a problem is 
merely an artifact of news media's failure to live up to its own importance principle. 
 
 This approach to the problem of democratic attention evokes Aristotle's idea that 
we are essentially political animals.31 All you have to do is show us the information that 
matters to our political life, and we will be interested in it, because it is in our political 
nature to be so interested. 
 
Whatever elements of truth this Aristotelian picture may contain, there are strong 
reasons to think that the problem of democratic attention would not automatically dissolve 
if the importance principle were consistently fulfilled. 
 
A first reason is that as any student of style knows, there are many ways to convey 
the same basic information. Compare the style of the report by special counsel Robert 
Mueller on then-president Trump's dealings with Russian operatives, with the concise, 
straightforward op-ed written by Anonymous in the early days of the Trump 
administration written as a warning to the public.32 Both pieces of writing aimed to convey 
serious crimes committed by the Trump and other central figures in the administration. 
But the op-ed was easy to understand, whereas the report was full of indirection and 
legalese. The difference was not only in content and length, but in style. 
 
A second reason to think the puzzle of democratic attention could challenge even a 
news media that fulfilled the importance principle was acknowledged by both Lippmann 
 
historical analysis of BuzzFeed in her (2019). As Snyder (2018) points out, when combined with 
political content, some of these types of arousal produce an illusion of becoming informed.  
31 Aristotle, Politics (1958). 
32 Anonymous (2018). On the style of the Mueller report, see Toobin (2020).  
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and Dewey in their discussions of the complexity of democratic society. In The Public and 
its Problems, Dewey emphasizes the indirect consequence of interactions in society that 
affect people who cannot trace those consequences back to their source. For instance, 
before the 1970’s, it was not known that the acidic rain and snow falling in the 
northeastern U.S. was caused by industrial sites in the Ohio Valley. This discovery helped 
identify the health impact of people living in Sweden and Norway from factories in 
Germany and England.33   
 
Dewey observed that we remain unaware of many of the laws, practices, and 
interactions that shape our lives. Given these epistemic limitations, we are often unaware 
of the set of people whose lives are all affected by the same factors. We don't know with 
whom we share a stake in a problem, or who has different or opposing stakes in the same 
problem. When decisions taken in one place by one set of actors affect the health of people 
in a different place, these people form a ‘public’ in Dewey’s sense. In this sense, modern 
publics are often invisible, and it takes journalism, among other types of institutions and 
practices, to make them visible.34 As we saw from the Kansas City Star's retrospective 
overview, journalists can distort their portrait of a public though their choices about which 
inquiries to pursue and which stories to make salient. 
 
 Taken together, these observations show that the category “information that 
important for the public to know about” leaves open how that information is presented, 
how it is framed, which parts are emphasized, and whether or not its importance is made 
manifest.  The puzzle of democratic attention is not therefore merely an artifact of the 
failure of news outlets to fulfill the importance principle.  The importance principle can be 
fulfilled in ways that make the importance of the content relatively more manifest or 
relatively less so. 
 
An informal observation may help illustrate this point for readers familiar with a 
mainstay of television news in the mid-1970’s and 1980’s: the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour. 
Many momentous things occurred during these years, and on the show they were 
discussed at length. But the discussions always sounded the same, regardless of the topic. 
The two unflappable anchors with the same demeanor never reacted much differently from 
 
33 Likens 1999, Oreskes and Conway 2010.   
34 There are two ways to describe the removal of these epistemic limitations, and Dewey uses them 
both. If you describe it by saying that the public exists all along but is invisible until the epistemic 
limitations are removed, then you’re talking about the public as a sets of people whose lives are affected 
by the same things (laws, interactions, practices) - whether or not they care about those things, and 
whether or not they know which things affect what they care about. When a sign is posted at a 
construction site that says “Notice of public hearing”, the operative meaning of ‘public’ is roughly 
‘anyone who may be affected’.  When Dewey talks about the public’s ‘eclipse’ and 'submergence' 
(chapter 4, 1927), he is talking this way.  
    At other times in (1927), he talks about the public coming into being only when the indirect 
consequences of interactions are made visible (chapter 2). Here, “the public” includes a type of political 
consciousness: one's awareness of a whole to which one belongs. Becoming aware of the factors that 
affect you indirectly makes you aware of the whole. It’s that awareness that constitutes a public, which is 
therefore more than just the set of people who are affected by a set of laws, practices, and interactions.    
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one occasion to the next, regardless of what anyone else said. If you weren’t already 
interested in the topics under discussion, you would probably not become interested in 
them from listening. 
 
But boring news shows are not the root of the problem of democratic attention. If 
they were, the problem would be analogous to the one faced by some parents: their young 
children should eat vegetables but they much prefer to eat cupcakes. This type of problem 
concerns only what to ingest: vegetables or cupcakes.  The nutritive results of ingestion 
take care of themselves.  
 
If the problem of democratic attention concerned merely what information to 
ingest, the solution would be infotainment: the genre that packages information in short 
spurts without extensive narratives, but still aims to convey supposedly important facts. As 
the parent of a picky toddler might coat brussels sprouts in maple syrup but avoid broccoli 
which can’t plausibly be sweetened, infotainment partly compromises importance, 
selecting only the important content that can be fit into an entertaining frame. 
 
 Ingestion is a poor model for the underlying problem, because the problem 
concerns a type of uptake that involves more than merely consuming information.  As the 
case of the Hatch Act suggests, the mechanisms of accountability to work fully, the publics 
to whom a leader is accountable have to feel invested in the outcomes. They have to feel 
that they have a stake in whether the leader governs properly or not. In the case of how 
public money is used, these stakes are straightforward: instead of using it to maximize 
public goods, a leader may use it extremely inefficiently, or use it to further his political 
career, or at an extreme, simply put it in his pocket. Merely staring at the television or 
website while it broadcasts reports that speak to whether this is happening or not may be a 
good start, but if the information had no further interactions with anyone's attitudes 
toward politics, the broadcasting would have no more effect than a sit-com or a movie.35 
Entertainment is the wrong model of accountability journalism.  
 
When looked at this way, the problem of democratic attention looks more 
specifically like a problem of standing attitudes that facilitate democracy, not occurrent 
intake with no further impact on a listener's mind.  To solve it, what's needed is a way to 
orient the reader. The crucial questions then become: which attitudes are democracy-
facilitating attitudes? And which principles of selection and framing of news stories can 
cultivate them?  
 
Viewing the problem in this way has implications for how to measure the kind of 
uptake that would constitute democratic attention. Occurrent engagement can be 
measured by how much time one spends taking it in, because by definition it lasts only as 
long as it occupies attention. When digital sites estimate occurrent engagement with 
content by measuring how much time one spends on a website displaying it, they don't 
 
35 A different point against infotainment is implicit in Snyder's (2018) observation that in the US, 
presenting news as national entertainment made news vulnerable to political opportunists who 
exploit the tools of entertainment to create harmful political fictions (p. 247). 
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measure directly whether people actually take in the information, let alone whether they 
remember it or whether it affects how they feel or think about their political communities. 
 
  By contrast, attitudinal engagement makes a more lasting impact by surviving in 
memory, where it remains available for further inferences and action. Attitudes are lasting 
mental states. They contribute to the standing dispositions a person has. To measure 
attitudinal engagement, instead of asking how much time people spend taking content in, 
we would ask how the person's attitudes were affected by it. If one never spends any time 
with the content at all (zero occurrent engagement), it will not engage one's attitudes, 
either. But there may be no further correlation between time spent and attitudes affected.  
 
I’ll argue that the core democratic attitude is seeing oneself and one's fellow 
politizens as potential political protagonists - a role excluded, I'll argue, by the strongman 
principle of salience, which tailors messages to construe listeners as loyalists to the 
strongman who remains the seat of political agency. The principle is to frame and select 
stories in a way that invites readers to see themselves as on a par with other politizens as 
potential political protagonists in public affairs. I’ll call this principle of salience the public-
as-protagonist principle.36  
 
This reorientation of the problem does not sidestep the pitfalls of boredom and the 
challenge of how to capture attention in the first place. Practically anything can be made 
boring or uninviting, including news articles that address readers as potential political 
protagonists. But if the problem of democratic attention is ultimately a problem of 
democratic attitude, then merely capturing attention is not sufficient to address it. 
 
 To make the case that the public-as-protagonist principle helps solve the problem of 
democratic attention, in the rest of this paper I explain what the principle says and 
illustrate with three kinds of examples. Since principle itself is independent of the 
dialectical role in the problem that I'm claiming for it, even readers who think there is no 
problem of democratic attention, or who come to doubt that the public-as-protagonist 
principle helps address it, may nonetheless be interested in exploring and evaluating the 
principle as a potential guide for selecting and framing of news stories.  
 
 
Part II. The public-as-protagonist principle 
 
The public-as protagonist principle recommends framing and selecting information 
to invite readers to view themselves and one another as potential political participants. 
Whatever else a news story reports, it should make explicit, when it can, the ways in which 
the reading public has a stake in how the situation reported unfolds; and it should make 
 
36 The movement known as "public journalism" has a similar label, but the major difference is that 
public-as-protagonist principle concerns the way that news stories are framed and selected, 
whereas public journalism is a larger class of efforts, on the page and off, to mobilize readers in 
civic participation. On the varieties of approaches to public journalism and criticisms of it see the 
papers in Glasser (1999), especially Schudson (1999). 
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explicit the ways in which they could affect its outcome. The stakes can be economic, 
political, or affective.  
 
In this general form, the principle may sound simple. But many complexities arise, 
including well-known imprecision of the very idea of a public. Is there just one public or are 
there many? If two people belong to the same public, will they necessarily be aware of this 
fact?  Will they necessary share the same 'public interests' in the important situation being 
reported? If there are multiple publics, or publics with different interests, what do the 
principle's recommendations amount to? 
 
The rest of this paper works with the following general answers. There are many 
publics. Two people (call them A and B) belong to the same public only if the outcome of a 
situation matters to them (not necessarily in the same way). A and B need not know each 
other. They need not know what stakes they hold in a problem, and need not know that an 
outcome matters to them, or how. In general, A and B can belong to the same public, while 
being quite epistemically impoverished about the situation that affects them. 
 
Removing epistemic limitations like these results in a type of political 
consciousness. Lifting such limitations leaves one aware of one's interests, or one's 
potential interests in an outcome. It also brings to light relationships to other people in the 
polity. As often happens in inquiry, removing one layer of ignorance may introduce 
another. For instance, learning that one is susceptible to the effects of acid rain may leave 
one with a rash of questions, including which industries are responsible, whether any 
measures can be taken to guard against its ill effects, what the prospects are for future 
prevention, and so on.  
 
Not every reader will be a potential protagonist in every story. But if the importance 
principle is fulfilled and the public-as-protagonist is applied consistently, then every 




 I'll draw on three types of examples to illustrate the public-as-protagonist principle 
at work, representing three major types of stories that connect news journalism directly to 
democracy: elections, accountability, and loss of life.  These examples are meant to 
illustrate the principle at work. The reasons to think that applications of the principle can 




A common approach to election coverage regards the campaigns as determined 
primary by the candidates and their interactions. The role of journalists is to decipher the 
criticisms the candidates launch at one another, and convey the state of play to the public.  
Like reporting on a horse race that provides a continuous stream of information about 
which horse has forged ahead and which has fallen behind, this approach highlights who is 
ahead in the polls.  
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The "horse race" approach treats the voting public as an audience who is interested 
in the micro-dynamics of the campaign. By contrast, according to the public-as-protagonist 
principle, the purpose of election coverage is to help voters set the agenda for the campaign 
by communicating which issues they think the candidates should address. This approach 
treats the voting public as stakeholders who need to make a decision and may have 
questions about how policy will connect with government. It does not matter whether 
journalists undertake this kind of opinion polling or rely on other outlets, so long as the 
opinions about which issues candidates should address are made salient.37 
 
  Another way to portray voters as inquirers as opposed to people who simply react is 
to make explicit how candidates’ positions unfold over the course of a campaign. Rosen 
(1999) gives an example of election coverage by the Wichita Eagle that elegantly created a 
way to display these responses by displaying campaign statements chronologically. Each 
week, the newspaper added updates to a list of commitments of each candidate, including 
whether the candidate restated a position an issue, or adjusted it. Using this format, the 
newspaper could highlight questions from the public and answers by the candidates. 
 
 By having an entry for each week and displaying the whole timeline, the newspaper 
made it possible to report if nothing had changed that week, if anything was clarified, or if 
any new positions had been taken. By creating a space in which a candidate's 
responsiveness or failures to respond to voters' reactions could be made salient, it 
implicitly treated candidates' positions as changeable in response to voters' reactions.  
 
 3.1.2 Accountability 
A second illustration of the principle concerns reporting on grift or other forms of 
corruption, such as using public resources to fund a political campaign. In reporting on 
misuses of taxpayer money, the taxpaying public figures as a protagonist just by virtue of 
the focus of the story. But there are further choices that can either foreground the specific 
communities who may be harmed by the misuse of funds, as the public-as-protagonist 
principle recommends, or leave them out of the picture altogether.   
 
 Consider the multiple charges of corruption made against the Republican politician 
Josh Hawley during his term as Attorney General of Missouri. All of the charges were based 
on information uncovered and reported by the Kansas City Star. This reporting gives us 
several examples of the public-as-protagonist principle at work, as well as examples where 
it could have been applied more extensively. 
 
Hawley was investigated by Missouri Secretary of State for using of taxpayer money 
to hire political consultants from Massachusetts and Louisiana during 2017 and 2018 to set 
 
37 As an example of public journalism, Rosen (1999) describes an effort in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
undertaken jointly by the Charlotte Observer, a local television station and the Poynter institute for 
Media Studies, that undertook telephone polling of readers to find out which issues they wanted 
candidates to discuss in an upcoming election, and then directed campaign coverage to those issues.   
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the agenda for the Attorney General office.38 The agenda they set seemed to be geared 
toward raising Hawley’s national profile in preparation for his run for senate against 
Democrat Claire McCaskill, whom he eventually defeated in the 2018 election. His office 
was also charged with violating Missouri open-records laws after he both declined to use 
government email and declined to turn over records of communications between the 
Attorney General’s office and political consultants, which would help determine the extent 
and nature of the role of political consultants.39   
   
Because it played a major role in instigating the investigations and in publicizing the 
results, the Kansas City Star’s reporting was successful accountability journalism, by the 
standard set by the importance principle. It could have played this role without doing much 
to successfully engage readers' attention. But the reports took a step toward highlighting 
the potential political roles of readers by including the email address and telephone 
number of the whistleblower hotline at the state auditor’s office, in case any readers had 
further information, and noting that under state law whistleblowers can remain 
anonymous.40 
 
Most members of the public are not in a position blow any whistles. But by including 
this information in the article, the journalists are highlighting that any such whistleblowers 
are regular members of the public, rather than political insiders to whom journalists have 
special access. In these ways, the coverage was treating the public as potential contributors 
in an inquiry that matters to everyone, and as people with a stake in how the inquiry turns 
out. 
 
In other ways, the Kansas City Star’s accountability reporting on Hawley kept the 
reading public at a distance from the situation it reported. It focused repeatedly on the 
disconnect between Hawley’s statement that he was “not the type of ladder-climbing 
politician who would continually seek higher office”, and his behavior while in office of 
allegedly devoting public resources to his political campaign.41 In the same vein of 
identifying instances of hypocrisy, the Star reminded readers that Hawley “had criticized 
Hillary Clinton’s use of a private server for sending and receiving emails while she was U.S. 
secretary of state” while campaigning for election to Attorney General, even though he 
appears to have done the same thing himself. “Sec. Clinton’s outrageous conduct & lack of 
prosecution shows we need an AG who knows how to win for the rule of law,” they 
reported him as having tweeted  during his campaign.42    
   
Pointing out this kind of hypocrisy is a way of discrediting the politician, and 
inviting the public to do the same.43 In a story that highlights politicians' hypocrisy, the 
 
38 Wise et al (2018a). 
39 Government email unlike private email becomes part of the public record. Ultimately Hawley was found not 
to have violated election law. See Hancock 2019a, Hancock et al 2019b.  
40 Wise (2019) 
41 Hancock et al 2019c. 
42 Wise 2018a, Hawley 2016. 
43 This position was reflected in the Star’s editorials that were highly critical of Hawley [cite]. It is an example 
of a newspaper's editorial outlook shaping the selection and framing of stories it reports. I discuss the 
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reading public is implicitly framed as a spectator of disappointing politics.44 The 
disappointment may be warranted, and it may justifiably make readers angry. But leaving 
things there relegates the reading public to the background. If the Attorney General has 
served his own political career at taxpayer's expense, and that's the end of the story, then 
the story treats it as an open possibility that there is no other way things could be.  
 
A more extensive application of the public-as-protagonist principle could list 
pending allegations, or past known infringements that were never litigated, or 
controversies over potential corporate, governmental or environmental infringements that 
affect the readers. This point of focus would make the monitoring function itself salient, 
instead of highlighting a politician's failure to perform it. The monitoring function turns the 
focus onto what the office is supposed to do for the public. 
3.1.3 Life and death  
 Election coverage and watchdog reporting focus on relationships between 
politicians and the people they aim to govern. Because elections and accountability in 
government are two defining features of a democracy, journalism plays an important role 
in facilitating democratic politics when it is designed to bolster accountability and 
participation in elections. 
 A third defining feature of democracy is political equality among the governed. 
Political equality is a relationship between members of the public, rather than the 
relationship between the government and the governed.  
 The decisions made by journalists about how to narrate losses of life and property 
can facilitate or anti-facilitate a sense of political equality. How?  
  When a newspaper publicizes deaths from traffic fatalities, an epidemic, natural 
disaster, or homicide, it can depict those deaths as losses by making salient what was lost 
when the people died: the people, places, and activities they cared about; the reactions of 
the people who cared about them; the roles they played in their community, and so on.  
 If the people lost happened to occupy a position of public service, such as being a 
janitor in a public school, the loss would be a loss of a public servant, and to that extent a 
loss to the public. But what if the people weren't officially public servants? Is publicizing 
what is lost simply satisfying to the people who knew the deceased? It is likely to affect 
them most strongly. It may also affect people who didn't know them, if they identify in 
some way with their situation. But there will often be scores of people who remain 
relatively indifferent to losses distant from their concerns. So what role could depicting 
such losses play in a democracy?  
 
relationships between outlook and selection including its epistemic dimensions in "Are there norms of 
salience?" (Siegel (ms)). 
44 As commentators over the years have noted, hypocrisy in politics is hardly ever the main problem (Shklar 
1984, Dover 2019, Siegel 2020). 
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 If the depiction of lives lost aim to evoke a feeling of loss, no matter who the 
deceased people are, then those depictions reflect an assumption of equal value of life.  
Consider reporting on the 1977 flood by the Kansas City Call. Unlike the Star, the Call 
featured stories and photos about the eight Black flood victims, interviews with residents 
who survived the flood, and stories about damage to the Bo Dollar riding club, where 
twenty-five horses drowned. The Call estimated that in losing the horses and the club, 250 
young people from the east side of Kansas City lost the place where they learned to ride 
and care for horses. This story makes salient what the property damage means to the 
people most directly affected by it.45  
 This example illustrates a type of loss and a depiction of it that makes the losses 
legible as losses, even to readers who had never even heard of the riding club and had no 
interest in horses.  
 Why does it matter for everyone, even those who are socially distant from a loss like 
this, how the loss is depicted, and whether they are depicted at all? 
 First, the various political roles of journalism that we've considered here are 
interdependent.  The premise of a newspaper is that there is a constant stream of events 
passing by a large population of readers who need to be kept up to date. From one issue of 
a newspaper to the next, some things are held constant while other things vary. The stories 
reported vary. The format of the newspaper stays constant, with its structure that gathers 
stories into one digital or printed location, making some stories in the unity more salient 
than the others.  
 The unity is most palpable in a print version, when a reader has to interact with the 
entire newspaper in order to read any part of it. But whether a newspaper is in print or 
digitized, the same reading public is addressed by all the stories in it. When the Kansas City 
Star photographs a white fellow who managed to rescue his cat from the flood, they aim to 
elicit sympathy from anyone who can understand what it's like to care about saving their 
cat.46 They are implicitly including this fellow and anyone who identifies with him as 
members of polity. When the same newspaper sidelines or omits losses of Black Kansas 
Citians, or presents them as undeserving of sympathy, the newspaper is excluding them 
from the reading public.47 But the reading public is presumed to be the same as the political 
 
45 The contrast between reporting by the Star and the Call noted in the Star's retrospective mirrors a contrast 
found in The East St Louis Massacre, a pamphlet submitted by Ida B. Wells in 1919 to then-Governor L of 
Illinois which included both her own reporting during the aftermath of the mob attacks on Black people and 
their property, and eyewitness reporting from the Chicago Tribune during the attack. In Wells-Barnett's 
reporting, the reader meets the people whose houses were ransacked and stolen from: we learn their names, 
how long they lived in East St Louis, their families and jobs, and sometimes what their house looked like and 
some of the things that were in it. From the Tribune's reporting, one learns only about the death of nameless 
persons, that they were Black, the location of crimes committed against them, and finally (and this was the 
reason for including it in the pamphlet) the indifference and inefficacy of the National Guard.    
46 Williams (2020).   
47 According to the Kansas City Star's former architecture critic Donald Hoffman, who worked for the paper 
when it was paired with the Times, “When I first came to the papers, I worked at police headquarters, and we 
were instructed not even to pay attention to Black murders or Black traffic fatalities. They just weren’t 
reported.  Cited in Adler (2020)  
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public addressed by watchdog reporting and election coverage. So in excluding Black 
Kansas Citians from narratives of losses, the type of asymmetry criticized in the Star's 
retrospective overview manifests an attitude of political inequality.48 
 The second reason that public depictions of loss matter for democracy concerns the 
epistemic situation of people belonging to the same polity. In a democratic polity, each 
politizen is supposed to have a say in decisions that affect fellow politizens. But if the losses 
of people on your side of town are not legible as losses to the people on the other side of 
town, why should you trust them to make decisions that will affect you? By making losses 
and their meaning publicly legible, a newspaper helps to foster trust among citizens in a 
political process.  
 Here it may be useful to contrast the public-as-protagonist principle with the 
strongman principles of salience. As a guide to what to make salient and what to 
background, the strongman principle does not focus on losses to a pluralistic public. The 
public is addressed and presented as reactive loyalists. If it is a protagonist at all, it gets 
that status from being imaginatively merged with the leader. In proto-fascist political 
culture, communications are meant to cultivate a range of hostile negative reactions to 
those politizens who according to the ideology do not belong in the polity at all.  
  The communications guided by the strongman principle of salience do not 
foreground any other differentiation within the public, besides the division between the 
people in the base and the others who supposedly do not belong in the polity. Here, an 
authoritarian style of governing that is served by the strongman principle has no need to 
highlight the varied contours of a pluralistic public, with a range of hopes and fears, losses 
and setbacks, aspirations and milestones. Whatever differences they have are eclipsed by 
their emotionally charged relationship to the leader, who claims to come from them, be 
part of them, and therefore especially well-placed to lead them.49  
 When it is applied to narrating losses, the public-as-protagonist aims to make the 
varieties of loss legible to the entire public, both for the readers for whom the losses are 
most proximate, and the readers to whom they are most distant, because deaths are an 
occasion to depict what was lost in losing the life. 
4. How does the public-as-protagonist principle meet the challenge? 
 I've attempted to illuminate the public as protagonist principle both by 
characterizing its values and the attitudes it attempts to cultivate, and by illustrating how it 
would orient three types of reporting. We're now in a position to consider whether it helps 
address the problem of democratic attention. We can break down the probe into two 
questions. One question concerns how journalism cultivates readers' attitudes, and another 
whether it is contributes to capturing attention at all: 
 
48 For more on the manifestation relation, see Siegel, "Are there norms of salience?." It is well-documented 
how cultivating attitudes of political inequality degrade, erode, undo or preclude democracy. For examples 
outside the American context, see P. Pomerantzev (2019), chapter 1 on Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines; 
and A. Applebaum (2020) chapter 4 on the rise of Spain's Vox Party. 
49 Ben-Ghiat 2020, Posner 2020. 
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 Q1. Does journalism conforming to the public-as-protagonist principle cultivate 
 attitudes that facilitate democracy? 
 Q2. Is journalism conforming to the public-as-protagonist principle more likely to 
 attract attention in the first place, compared to journalism that respects the 
 importance principle but does not highlight the roles for members of the public as 
 potential political protagonists?   
 Regarding Q1, the democracy-facilitating attitudes in question are: an awareness of 
the different public stakes in a problem; the presumption that one is a potential 
protagonist; and a disposition, or at least a psychological possibility, of inquiring further 
into at least some of the problems highlighted in the news that respects the importance 
principle. The public-as-protagonist principle is designed to cultivate those attitudes. Are 
there reasons to think it actually will cultivate them?  
 An experimental approach to testing whether it works would have to operationalize 
both salience principles  - the importance principle and public-as-protagonist principle - 
and then find a way to measure the self-conception of readers of the two experimentally 
relevant categories of important news stories: those that conform to the public-as-
protagonist principle and those that do not. This type of experiment would have to be 
conducted over an extended period, in which participants were shielded from one type of 
journalism while being exposed to another. It would also need to control for other factors 
that could influence that self-conception. For instance, it could turn out that to have any 
effect, such journalism needs reinforcement from other modes of encouraging civic 
engagement through education or other organizations. If it turned out that the journalism 
guided by the public-as-protagonist principle contributed nothing to democratic attitudes, 
then that would be a reason to think it doesn't fully address the challenge posed by the 
problem of democratic attention. 
Independent of any such experiment's results, plausibility considerations make it 
reasonable to hypothesize that applying the principle could have some effect on attitudes. 
Treating audiences as consumers seeking entertainment made infotainment seem like a 
normal guise for the news, so that in seeking news one could also be seeking 
entertainment. By analogy, treating audiences as if it were culturally normal for them to 
consider themselves and one another as political protagonists might make it seem more 
culturally normal to consider oneself in this way. Lasch (1990) claims that people in the US 
were never more politically engaged than they were during the era of "partisan" 
journalism, which was addressed people as if they were politically opinionated. If he is 
right, that conclusion may favor the idea that journalism conforming to the public-as-
protagonist principle would cultivate democratic attitudes. 
 
More specifically, it seems reasonable to expect different effects on attitudes 
depending on the starting state of the audience. Consider three categories: (a) people tuned 
out of politics entirely, who tend not to take in much news media; (b) people involved on 
local organizing in which they response to threats they feel to their own security or well-
being, or that of their communities, but tuned out of most national and international 
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politics; (c) political hobbyists who follow all sorts of news closely, because for them it is 
entertaining or otherwise emotionally engaging, or intellectually satisfying, or both.50 
 These categories are obviously not exhaustive. A community organizer could also be 
well-informed about issues beyond the ones they are focused on, and nothing stops a news 
junkie from joining political organizations. But at least one political scientist, Hersh (2020), 
claims that groups (b) and (c) are cultural archetypes: people from group (c) primarily seek 
power to influence how the government operates; people from group (b) primarily track 
how power is distributed. People from group (a) do neither.   
When journalism respects both of the importance principle and the public-as-
protagonist principle, it is reasonable to expect differential effects on each these groups. On 
the people tuned out of politics entirely, it would seem to have a better chance at 
cultivating the attitudes it aims to cultivate, compared with journalism that doesn't try to 
show readers why they should care about the stories, if they don't already.  By contrast, for 
people who already see themselves as political protagonists, it might simply reinforce this 
presumption. It may have less effect on hobbyists, if they are determined to maintain the 
stance of an ironist, observing the political scene from a distance.  I put these ideas forward 
as plausibility considerations, subject to adjustment from experimental or other 
considerations. 
  
Regarding Q2, there is indirect evidence that systematically failing to treat the 
public as protagonists will drive readers away. Consider the Kansas City Star-Times ' 
retrospective verdict that for over a century, their coverage systematically excluded of 
Black Kansas Citians as political protagonists, both in the ways that losses were narrated 
(as the flood example shows) and in the omission of reporting "the achievements, 
aspirations and milestones of an entire population." The Kansas City Call did not have this 
problem, and it had greater credibility with Black readers - presumably a precondition for 
more occurrent engagement.51 Between 1915 and 1925, the Chicago Defender, the Black 
newspaper with the largest circulation in the US during the 20th century, played a major 
role in the Great Migration through its coverage of violence in the south and job and 
housing opportunities in northern cities. Here, they were urging Black Americans to leave 
one polity and join another. Their readers were addressed as political protagonists. The 
fact that Defender's circulation rose steadily during these years and after reinforces the 
natural suggestion that readers are indeed attracted in part by being treated as members of 
a polity whose lives, decisions, and options matter.  
 
50 Hersh (2020) draws a useful distinction between two kinds of political engagement, by focusing on the 
distinction between people in groups (b) and (c). One of his examples of type (b) is a bus monitor from 
Haverhill, MA who leads the Latino Coalition, a community organization that monitors its local government 
(police, school superintendent, mayor) on issues related to its residents who have immigrated from the 
Spanish-speaking parts of Latin America, such as how the city will interact with ICE under the Trump 
administration and whether there will be Spanish-speaking staff at schools. He contrasts this type of 
organizing with the mode of political engagement done by college-educated people, which consists primarily 
in informing themselves about a large range of political issues by reading about them online where they 
interact with others by sharing reactions, and argues that while type (c) may feel like political engagement 
and may even superficially appear that way, it has little effect on actual political change.  
51 Eligon, J. and Gross, J. 2020.  
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For the case of watchdog journalism, a similar argument may apply. Suppose the 
only people with a major role in holding powerful leaders accountable were journalists 
who ask "tough questions" at hearings.  If the effects on the public of accountability or 
unaccountability are left out of the news story, then the links to the stakes for various 
publics have to be drawn by readers who may be unable to draw them, putting them into a 
position analogous to Lippmann's deaf spectator. Journalists who frame their stories in a 
way that comports with this picture do not offer readers any way to locate themselves in 
relation to the event reported as people affected adversely or positively, as people who can 
have any effect on the political future. By contrast, if journalism makes clearer along the 
way why it matters to the public, there is at least something explicit in the story that a 
reader could identify as a reason for her to be taking it in.   
  
 I conclude with a leftover question. 
 
  I've focused on a specific kind of journalism: the kind produced by the 
professionalized apparatus developed in the 1920’s in the US. Its professional structure 
includes newspapers that gather different kinds of stories in one print or digital place; 
editors who by their own lights are supposed to publish news that is important for the 
public to know about; a profession that trains writers in methods and inculcates them into 
a code of ethics; and institutions that grant press passes. 
 
 Both the problem of democratic attention and the public-as-protagonist principle 
are separable from this specific kind of journalism. As the example of the Chicago Defender 
shows, journalists before professionalization produced stories that fulfilled both principles, 
and in recent times, citizen journalism has played similar roles. The professional structure 
of newspapers made familiar in the last century is clearly not the only way to fulfill these 
principles. A residual question raised by this discussion is what the relative advantages and 
drawbacks are, compared with other forms that journalism could take.52 
 
 Zooming out even further, journalism's roles in democracy are unified by the ways 
their contribution to building a set of overlapping publics through what it chooses to make 
salient and how it selects and frames its stories. Professionalized journalism can do this, 
and so can its adjacent forms. Seen in this light, journalism is but one means among others 
of shaping the contours of civic engagement and education and defining the publics that 
operate in aspirationally democratic polities. But a society without an entrenched culture 
of following a story where it leads, whether that culture is found in professionalized 








52 Abramson (2019) can be read as historically rich exploration of this question.  
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